Going Nuclear: Conclusion

Despite all that we know, what is surprising is the Washington Times sudden revelation of facts which were publicized years ago. The Nixon document was declassified in 1997. And ten years ago, Avner Cohen, in his book Israel and the Bomb wrote:

"A new set of American-Israeli understandings on the nuclear issue came into being in 1970 through meetings between President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir. The United States no longer pressed Israel to sign the NPT; it also ended the visits at Dimona. In return, Israel is committed to maintaining a low profile nuclear posture: no testing, no declaration, no acknowledgment. With these "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" understandings nuclear opacity was born. Those understanding persist today."

If the US is now willing to force Israel's hand, one must wonder why. Assuming Israel does possess assembled nuclear devices, there's really next to no possibility that she would voluntarily destroy her best deterrent against Arab weapons of mass destruction. Only a complete US arms embargo might compel a policy change, but this is unlikely. Denied American weapons, Israel would quickly turn to others for military hardware. Germany is already selling Israel Dolphin class submarines and would probably be eager to add fighter jets to the account. In fact, Israel had been developing a new model of the Swedish-made Gripen fighter jet, in conjunction with Saab, for India until forced out of the competition by the US. In 2008, Israel was forced not to submit a bid in a 500 million dollar deal to develop a new tank for Turkey, ostensibly by the Americans. And end to decades of weapons cooperation between the US and Israel would open the door to direct competition, a scenario the US defense industry would surely not welcome in the middle of an economic downturn.

Perhaps this US administration simply believes the relationship has outlived its usefulness, Israel no longer providing a front-line defense against Soviet expansionism. Or more likely, we can add this story to a long list of would-be scandals involving Israel, precipitated by the State Department, in defiance of the White House and the American people who have been resolute in their support of the Jewish state. The State Department - and its friends in the CIA and Justice Department - has always argued against overt support for Israel, which it has felt threatens America's relationship with Arab oil providers. Some of the battles between various State Department heads and Presidents are legendary. President Truman, for example, once complained that, "those State Department fellows were always trying to put it over on me about Palestine, telling me that I really didn't understand what was going on there, that I ought to leave it to experts."

For years, various State Department officials and sympathizers have maintained a war of words against the Jewish State. ‘Realists’ Mersheimer and Walt’s Lobby screed was just one round in this old conflict. In 2005, the Justice Department indicted two staff members of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) on trumped up allegations (based on a rarely used 1917 Espionage law) that they had passed along a confidential memo to an Israeli Embassy official. This year it was announced that the charges against the two AIPAC members would be dropped. Last year, the best the State Department could come up with was a 23-year old allegation against an 84 year-old veteran who, out of some misplaced sense of loyalty to Israel, passed on useless information (apparently details about F-15's, which Israel was already flying) to some low-level consulate staff member.

Cue Rose Gottemoeller, the latest conveyer of news meant to discomfit friends of Israel and malign the Jewish state.

So, is any of this really evidence of a secret accord, and more importantly, a change in the US-Israel relationship? As for the accord, the evidence suggests no official accord as such, but rather an understanding to drop the issue. There's a difference. And the State Department threats may yet turn out to be paper tigers. Earlier this month, The Washington Times reported that Prime Minister Netanyahu has been assured by the US President that the “don’t ask, don’t tell” understanding will be maintained.

And that understanding, which says so much about this unique bilateral relationship, reveals important distinctions between the functions and behaviour of the State Department and Congress. Unelected officials of the State Department serve the nation; elected members of Congress and the President serve the nation’s constituents. Both roles are crucial. But, it’s a dangerous thing when anyone believes the state must prevail at all costs; there are times when the nation’s citizens may choose a course of action that is not prudent, but is in keeping with the values of the state. American support for Israel is a case-in-point, as was made abundantly clear when it was revealed that the President was sent a letter signed by 76 (of 100) Senators reminding Obama to "take into account the risks [Israel] will face in any peace agreement," and “to insist on the absolute Palestinian commitment to ending terrorist violence and to building the institutions necessary for a viable Palestinian state living side-by-side, in peace with the Jewish state of Israel."

After his first year in office, many are asking if Barak Obama truly understands the complex nature of Middle East politics. Early statements and demands of Israel have suggested naivety more than belligerency. And, despite some setbacks, last week’s appointment of Tamara Cofman Wittes as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs is a definite step in the right direction. Dr. Wittes is Director of the Middle East Democracy and Development (MEDD) Project at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, a regional policy center at The Brookings Institution. She has also taught at Georgetown University and is a recipient of the Rabin-Peres Peace Award, established by President Bill Clinton.

There’s no question that public support for Israel is solid. A recent poll conducted by Neil Newhouse of Public Opinion Strategies and Stan Greenberg of Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research (GQRR) suggests that, despite the Gaza war, support for Israel is actually rising, with 63 percent of respondents, up from 49 percent just a few months ago, declaring themselves Israel supporters. With that in mind, the President now has the awesome responsibility to balance that support with the nation’s other needs. This has always been the challenge. But, the great Presidents have been the ones who could meet the practical needs while preserving America’s ethical core.

In all honesty, we can ask, has this enviable support for Israel always been pragmatic? Probably not. Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin put the question to Lyndon Johnson when he met the President in 1967. "I don't understand you Americans backing Israel," said Kosygin. "There are 80 million Arabs and only 3 million Israelis. It does not make sense. Why do it?"

Replied Johnson: "Because it is right."

Going Nuclear: Part II

The next day, Secretary of State Rusk tabled a meeting specifically to discuss America’s nuclear concerns. Representing Israel were Foreign Minister Abba Eban, Ambassador Avraham Harma and Ephraim Evron. Rusk insisted that Israel’s continued obstinacy could have a, “disastrous effect on U.S.-Israeli relations” Abba Eban understood the US position but maintained that political issues at home made public declarations and visits to Dimona difficult. It was, of course, public declarations that the US was seeking. “Private assurances were of limited value,” averred Rusk.

Private assurances would have to do. Despite an agreement to sell Israel Skyhawk bombers, Prime Minister Eshkol refused any formal written agreement which, in his words, “might indicate to future historians that he had bargained away Israel's future nuclear policy and opened the Dimona facility to US inspection for the sake of ‘a mere 48 airplanes.’"

Even so, an understanding was arrived at that worked for both sides. The Americans would maintain Israel’s military advantage believing that “if Israel [was] unable to obtain its valid conventional arms requirements, those in Israel who advocate acquisition of nuclear weapons [would] find a much more fertile environment for their views.”

As part of the understanding, a team of U.S. nuclear experts visited Israeli atomic energy sites between March 31 and April 4, 1966; a few months later a memorandum from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to Secretary of Defense McNamara reported “the unanimous conclusion of the three-man team that there is no evidence that Israel is producing or intends to produce nuclear weapons material.”

Over the next year, the Soviets publicly pushed for a nuclear free Middle East and the Americans, at least in principle, agreed to the proposal. But, each time the issue was raised with Israel, the answer was always the same: Israel wasn’t pursuing nuclear weapons. And each time, the Americans seemed to accept the rejoinder. Until February 1967, that is, when American Embassy in Tel Aviv reported to the Secretary of State that “two Israeli contacts [had suggested] Israel could be much closer to nuclear weapons capability than...supposed. The State Department requested an urgent assessment. Israel agreed to another Dimona inspection and once again the “AEC team found no evidence that Israel [was] using Dimona to produce material for use in nuclear weapons.” Of course, they couldn’t rule out the existence of another nuclear facility, or Israel’s potential for building a weapon on short-notice.

On a personal note, I had the opportunity to speak with a retired Dimona engineer in June of this year. I was intrigued when he said he was at Dimona during these inspections. "Was anything deliberately hidden from the inspectors?" I asked. "No," he responded. "Was there perhaps another nuclear facility whose existence was kept from the Americans?" I suggested. "Not that I knew of," he replied.

In May 1967, the State Department reported once more to President Johnson that there was, “no evidence that Israel [was] actually making a bomb,” but they remained convinced that..."Israel intends to keep itself in a position to do so at reasonably short notice should the need arise."

As the Six-Day War began, France reneged on arms deals with Israel and declared a weapons boycott, refusing to supply parts for Israel's French-made Mirage jets. Following the war, Israel was anxious to replace the Mirage, especially in light of the USSR's rapid re-arming of Egypt and Syria. Israel was pushed by need directly into the US sphere of influence.

In January 1968, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol met with President Johnson to urgently request military aid, especially the Phantoms. Johnson, who was a longstanding supporter of Zionism, assured Eshkol that the US would stand by Israel. But, as the negotiations for the jets proceeded over the next few months, opposition – namely linkage between the aircraft sale and the nuclear issue – emerged.

But, it was likely the State Department that was doing the pushing and Israel pushed back. Attempts by Paul Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, to verify Israel's Dimona promises obligated Israel to request that the White House intervene. Secretary of Defense Clarke Clifford told Warnke to end the talks and not press the matter of verification.

In lieu of a formal agreement, Israel provided the US with a promissory letter, signed by Israel's Ambassador to the US Yitzhak Rabin, that Israel would not introduce nuclear weapons into the conflict. Israel reaffirmed "its long-standing policy as laid down in...1965 that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons and [agreed] not to use any aircraft supplied by the US and a nuclear weapons carrier. Israel and the US, however, continued to have a very different understanding as to the meaning of the concept of "introduction" of weapons. Israel's position was that as long as no weapons had been tested and publicly announced no "introduction" had been made. The issue was still outstanding as Johnson’s term ended in 1969.

At the start of his administration, Nixon assembled a 'special group' - Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Under Secretary of State Elliott Richardson, CIA Director Richard Helms, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Earle Wheeler, and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger - to “consider the status of the Israeli nuclear program and [US] responses to it."

"Public knowledge is almost as dangerous as possession itself," wrote Kissinger in the memorandum dated July 9, 1969 from the 'special group' to Nixon. "This is what might spark a Soviet nuclear guarantee for the Arabs, tighten the Soviet hold on the Arabs and increase the danger of our involvement"

Nevertheless, the document confirms that the US still wanted Israel to sign onto the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israel was also expected to publicly commit not to acquire nuclear weapons, according to Kissinger. It's clear from this document - despite what the Washington Time's Eli Lake asserted - that the US did not yet believe that Israel possessed nuclear weapons. “We should try to keep Israel from going any further with its nuclear weapons program --it may be so close to completion that Israel would be willing." The State Department and Defense agree, however, that for their "own internal purposes [they] could tolerate Israeli activity short of assembly of a completed nuclear device." Disturbingly, Lake, in his article, actually falsified the text to suggest that Israel already possessed nukes at this point. 'Israel would likely have 24 to 30 French surface-to-surfaces missiles, 10 of which would have nuclear warheads,' he wrote, but the actual document read: "ten of which are programmed for nuclear warheads." A big difference.

Still, the Americans had a problem. If they withheld the Phantoms, they would have to publicly disclose - or allow Israel to disclose - why and reveal Israel's nuclear program, which they were very reluctant to do. Nixon was presented with several alternatives including to "not raise the issue." Did Nixon choose this option? A follow-up Memo, dated October 7, 1969, suggests the answer. Nixon had met with Golda Meir and in "private discussions...emphasized that [the] primary concern was the Israelis make no visible (my emphasis) introduction of nuclear weapons or undertake a nuclear test program."

Kissinger asked Ambassador Rabin for a formal response and received assurances that Israel would not become a nuclear power, and would consider the NPT. A few months later, Israel informed the US that they would not sign onto the NPT. But, these assurances seemed to be enough to provide the Americans with a "rationale for standing down," as Kissinger put it. In any event, from this point on, the pressure was off, as least as can be ascertained from declassified documents. The two sides seemed to have agreed on a policy of 'Nuclear ambiguity.'

Yet, the State Department continued to investigate Israel's nuclear ambitions even though some officials had "reservations about whether or not Israel [had] produced and assembled a complete nuclear weapon." Joseph J. Sisko, an assistant secretary of state and JCS Chairman Earle Wheeler continued to fight to prevent Israel from going nuclear. The US “ought to push the NPT urgently" they demanded. And Robert Munn, well into 1970, pressed for another visit to Dimona.

At the same time, the Soviets were shipping tons of weapons, MIG-21 jets and thousands of military advisors into Egypt. Unwilling to allow the USSR to tip the balance of power away from Israel, the US finally agreed on September 1, 1970 to sell Israel the Phantoms.

Within weeks, the favour would be repaid. On September 21, Nixon received an urgent plea from Jordan's King Hussein: Jordan had been invaded by Syria and required "immediate physical intervention, both air and land...to safeguard [the] sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Jordan."

Nixon instructed Kissinger to contact Yitzhak Rabin. "Don't ask anybody else. Tell him 'Go.' Israel prepared aircraft and moved troops toward the border with Jordan. The next day, the Syrians backed down and called their tanks and troops home.

Henry Kissinger relayed Nixon's appreciation to the Israelis. "The President will never forget Israel's role in preventing the deterioration in Jordan," Rabin wrote in his memoirs. Israel had now proven itself willing and capable of defending American interests in the region. The leverage had now permanently shifted in Israel's favour. Throughout his term, Nixon would remain a steadfast friend, providing emergency airlifts of weapons and supplies during the October War in 1973, and consistently stonewalling further attempts by the State Department to investigate Israel's nuclear program.

How subsequent administrations dealt with the issue will become clear as more documents become declassified in the future.

To be continued...Going Nuclear: Conclusion.

Going Nuclear: Part I

Well, I finished a piece on Israel's nuclear program and, having not sold it and wanting to move on, I'm posting it instead. It's long so I'm breaking it down into 3 parts.

Is the United States changing its policy toward a nuclear Israel?

Hot on the heels of a statement by Assistant U.S. Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller urging Israel to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, President Obama announced plans for an international nuclear summit to be held March 2010. Although the summit is expected to focus on nuclear terrorism, Arab states have been demanding that Israel’s alleged nuclear program be put on the agenda.

Last May, The Washington Times asserted that the US and Israel have maintained a secret accord for 40 years to keep from the public Israel's nuclear weapons capabilities. The Times' Eli Lake presents a declassified memo between Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon as evidence and writes that 'by the end of 1970, Israel would likely have 24 to 30 French surface-to-surfaces missiles, 10 of which would have nuclear warheads.'

Is the United States now changing its policy toward a nuclear Israel? Has America protected Israel’s nuclear ambitions for 40 years? An historical perspective is in order.

It was clearly in America's interests to avoid a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, which would diminish stability in an already volatile neighbourhood and surely engage the USSR in some way. Since the Johnson Administration (1963 to 1969), the US has kept a close watch on Israel's nuclear aspirations and has repeatedly asserted the importance of keeping nukes out of the region. Throughout March 1965, State Department and Israel officials were engaged in heavy negotiations over President Johnson’s regional water plans. Johnson hoped to settle water disputes between Israel and her neighbours and proposed "an aggressive and imaginative program to advance progress in large-scale desalting of sea water." The plan involved "a combination of large-scale nuclear power plants and large-scale desalting plants could produce power and water."

The nuclear weapons issue came up on many occasions, each time Israel insisting it was not pursuing nuclear weaponry. The State Department, a recurrent thorn in Israel’s side, stressed the US position to Israeli authorities. "We've already made and remade every point...in far stronger terms, especially on nuclear weapons. I'm surprised Israelis still speak to me," wrote Robert W. Komer, the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. In fact, Israel never denied the possibility of such a pursuit, reserving the right to do so depending on Egypt’s actions; Israel was convinced at the time that Egypt also had a nuclear agenda.

Nevertheless, the Americans remained certain that Israel was already pursuing nuclear weapons technology. "All indications are toward Israeli acquisition of a nuclear capability," wrote Rodger Davies, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, "There is little realization in Israel of the intensity of U.S. opposition to nuclear proliferation. U.S. hesitation and delays in pressing for the recent inspection of the Dimona reactor plus the failure to insist upon a two-day visit have led the Israelis to believe we are not serious."

The Americans at this point stepped up the pressure. The State Department informed the Embassy in Israel to let it be known that an "offer to supply arms in the future [would be] carefully hedged and made contingent upon Israeli acceptance of undertakings on Jordan waters and on nuclear development..." The Americans had visited Dimona, the site of a planned nuclear power station, in 1961 and were satisfied at the time that Israel wasn't developing weapons. However, within a few years, things weren't so clear. By the mid-60s, the Americans assumed that Israel now possessed the scientific talent to build nuclear weapons but had yet to do so. A CIA assessment from 1965 alleged that "the Israelis could probably develop nuclear weapons by 1968-1969 and/or nuclear warheads by about 1971 [but did] not believe, however, that the Israelis have taken such a decision."

Officially, the State Department spoke of Israel’s "peaceful nuclear program," but they continued to harp on the weapons issue. Secretary of State Dean Rusk began to press President Johnson to pressure Israel "to accept IAEA safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities." Israel had signed the partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, and was a member of IAEA, but had not accepted IAEA safeguards on the Dimona facility. On May 21, 1965 Johnson asked Eshkol "to place the Dimona reactor and all other nuclear facilities under IAEA controls...and for any U.S. materials or equipment transferred to Israel in connection with the U.S.-Israel desalting program." Eshkol, much to Johnson’s displeasure, asked that the issue be deferred until after the next Israeli election. As the year came to a close, the State Department still had to concede that there was "no evidence that Israel or any other Near Eastern state [was] in position to develop nuclear weapons in near future or that they have decided [to] develop or otherwise acquire them." (Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, November 4, 1965, 10:35 a.m.)

Through the 1950's and early 60's, Israel had maintained close ties to Britain and France, both of whom were eager to preserve some influence in Middle East affairs. This trilateral relationship reached its apex with the attack against Egypt in 1956. But, by the mid-60s these relationships had cooled, especially with France which was dealing with Algeria. Nevertheless, the French government, which had supplied Israel with nuclear technology (as had the British, which, in 1958, supplied heavy water for plutonium production without informing the Americans), and was negotiating to sell Israel surface-to-surface missiles, remained convinced that "there was no evidence of any attempt by Israel to produce materials for nuclear weapons."

With the war of words between Israel and the Arabs heating up, Israel approached the US for more advanced weaponry. Israel had previously signed a deal with West Germany for 150 M48A2 tanks to replace aging French AMX-13 and British Centurions (upgraded and renamed the Sho’t) but due to opposition from Arab states, the Germans reneged on the deal after only 40 tanks had been delivered. Johnson approved an agreement to supply Israel with the remaining tanks, and an additional 100 M48s.

What Israel really wanted, however, was fighter jets. The US now had the upper hand. It was Robert Komer who made the obvious suggestion: "Can we use planes as a lever to keep Israel from going nuclear?"


to be continued: Going Nuclear Pt. II

Historia Shel Hakolnoah Israeli

When I began this blog in 2005, my intent was to write much more on Israeli films. I ran a Jewish film festival for eight years, and have worked in the film industry for *cough* 20 years so it seemed like a good idea. But, for some reason, I've spent more time writing on political and historical subjects and have only touched on the entertainment industry.

Fortunately, someone has started the blog I meant to write. Amy Kronish, who was a guest of the Vancouver Jewish Film Festival some years ago, has written and lectured on Israeli film for years. The blog features film reviews and links to film resources.

Check it out here.

Massacre Mania 2

Perusing Palestinian websites for information on the 'Naqba' (1947-48), one finds anecdotal claims of so many massacres, it's astonishing that 6,000, let alone 600,000, refugees survived to flee the country.

I was recently asked to look into one such massacre claim, on behalf of someone whose family came from Palestine. He was told that his Uncle survived a massacre of Saliha which killed almost everyone else.

Saliha was a small Arab Muslim village in the Upper Galilee Mountains next to the Lebanese border, near present-day Moshav Avivim. The village was known for its Taggart fort, built in 1938 by the British as a garisson fort. The Taggart forts were part of a larger plan to build a "northern fence" to separate Palestine from Lebanon at the height of the Arab rebellion (1936-1939).

After months of conflict, the War of Independence began in earnest when statehood was declared: May 14, 1948. Israelis forces had fought back the Arab Liberation Army in the north, July 8-18, 1948, during Operation Dekel. The final battle for the Galilee began in late October 1948. Thousands of Arab fighters led by Fawzi Kaukji returned from Lebanon and occupied positions inside Arab villages two kilometeres beyond the truce lines established by the UN. After a warning by the UN Security Council, Kaukzi claimed on October 24 that his troops were withdrawing, but they returned a few days later and continued to occupy several strategic positions, including a hill a few yards from the Metullah-Tiberias crossroads. Despite repeated attempts by the UN to prevent a conflagration, both sides remained poised for battle: Jewish forces refused to accept a cease-fire until Kaukzi returned to the previous ceasefire position; Kaukzi refused to budge until the Jewish fighters accepted the ceasefire.

With Arab forces firmly entrenched in defensive positions in western Galilee, Canadian-born Ben Dunkelman, commander of the 7th Brigade, presented plans for conquering the Galilee to Moshe Carmel (1911-2003), Israel's northern front commander. Despite some reservations Dunkelman was given a "green light" to dislodge the Arab Liberation Army and drive it back into Lebanon. On the evening of October 27, 7th Brigade engineers began clearing the Safed-Meron road as the rest of the brigade moved from its base in western Galilee to the hills around Safed. Operation Hiram began at dawn, October 28.

According to many sources, most of the residents of the Galilee had actually begun to flee in May 1948, after the capture of the Arab part of the city of Safed by Palmach forces. By August the UN reported at least 50,000 Galilean Arab refugees had crossed the border and fled to the nearby Metawali villages in southern Lebanon. Nevertheless, it's clear thousands of civilians remained.

Benny Morris, who cites Saliha in several books, doesn`t provide an exact an date for the massacre but Palestinian sources say it took place on October 30. The actual events surrounding the destruction of Saliha are not at all clear. Some sources claim the residents were forced into a mosque and shot; others say they were shot in the village square; others quote Benny Morris' who wrote that "94 ... were blown up with a house."

Unfortunately, even Morris can't quite get his story straight. In one book (The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, Cambridge Middle East Library, pg. 230) he claims this information came from a briefing given by Israel Galili, head of the Haganah National Command; in a later book he says the briefing was made by Moshe Erem, to the Political Committee of Mapam ("Revisiting the Palestinian Exodus of 1948," Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim (eds.), The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 59)

The UN record suggests civilian casualites were much lighter than anecdotal evidence would have some believe. Given that there were several hundred observers watching both Israeli and Arab forces - there were approximately 300 UN Observers in the Middle East at this time. Around 245 were in Israel according to US Ambassador to Israel James G. Macdonald - one would expect that mass killings would be difficult to conceal; in fact, only one was reported to the security council during this period. On November 3, 1948, A. R. Azzam, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, filed a complaint that "Zionist forces, in a raid on the Arab locality known as Dawayma, ruthlessly massacred Arab women, children and old people, thus perpetuating barbarities rivaling in horror those committed by the Nazis."

Despite official assurances to the contrary (and the fact that Dawayam was north of Hebron, nowhere near the Galilee), rumours of a massacre in Dawayma were taken seriously and both the UN and the Israeli army investigated. Two UN observers visited Dawayma on November 7 and found no evidence of a massacre but it's likely the village had already been cleaned up before their arrival. Veterans of the accused 89th Battallion have claimed that some soldiers sought revenge for the massacre of 200 Jews in Kfar Etzion several months earlier. Dawayma, they claimed, was "filled with the loot of Etzion Bloc." UN Chief negotiator Ralph Bunche's reports reveal only "that United Nations Observers had reported extensive looting of villages in Galilee by Israeli forces, who carried away goats, sheep and mules."

The Dawayma incident is interesting in several respects. Although the alleged massacre occured in another part of the country, it confirms that the nascent Israeli government was aware of attacks against civilians. Significantly, it's obvious that it was difficult in such a tiny country to prevent rumours of atrocities from quickly spreading - regardless of whether or not the allegations were true. The attack on Deir Yassein, after all, was front-page news in the country. Other incidents may not have made the news but they were known to the government and UN observers. Moshe Carmel, for his part, even issued a reprimand to his troops as word of unacceptable behaviour came to light.

"Our brilliant victory...in the Galilee was marred as some soldiers allowed themselves a shameful outburst by looting and condemnable crimes against the Arab population after its surrender...ill-treatment of the inhabitants, murder and robbery, are not a military activity or acts of courage. They are a disgrace to our army...These acts must cease immediately and with all severity." (IDFA 437/49/84 25 November 1948)

Of course, many of the reports were made after the fact, and long after any evidence of wrong-doing was erased. Morris, whose books are most often cited concerning Galilee massacres, conceded that "knowledge of the details of these massacres is limited mainly to Arab oral and written testimony and some United Nations and Israeli civilian documentation."

After the war, the stories spread and took on lives of their own. Respected journalist Martha Gellhorn interviewed Palestinian refugees in Israel. In one village, she spoke with the schoolteacher...

"...an attractive lean young man, with prematurely gray hair, working in his garden in the cool of the evening...After hours of listening to him, I had grasped the lacking clue, and felt hopeless."

"Great Britain helped the Jews," he said. "The English gave weapons to the Arab countries, and they gave weapons to us. In this village we were all armed; we all fired at the Jews, every one of us. But our bullets were no good; the English gave bad bullets to the Arabs. Four out of five of the bullets were no good. When we saw this, we ran away to Lebanon for two weeks and then we came back."

"Were any of you killed in these battles?"

"No, no one."

"The Christian schoolteacher sent me on to a friend of his, a Muslim schoolteacher, in a village called Masra on the plain near Acre...Before 1948, the population of Masra was 350; now it is 200. They owned little land, they had worked on neighboring kibbutzim and in Acre factories. They always had good relations with the Jews. "No one here shot at Jews; and no Jews shot at us." (Note the order of the sentence.) But now Masra had grown and swollen; 900 refugees lived here.

"Refugees?"

"Yes, people from those villages."

He gestured out the door, across the fields.

"What? From villages nearby?"

"Yes, yes. Those villages. They are maybe seven kilometers away."

"And you consider them refugees?"

"Of course. There was no fighting near here, but the people are frightened, so they fled to the Druse villages, where they know they will be safe, because the Druses were always friendly with the Jews, and after, they came here. The Israeli government will not let them go back to their villages. The government offered them other land, but they will not take it."

Gellhorn also spoke with Palestinians who had fled northward to Lebanon.

"Their headman, or village leader - the Muktar talked. Seventeen people of his village were massacred, which was why they fled, but an old blind woman of 104 was left behind and the Jews poured kerosene over her and burned her alive. How did they know, if they had all fled? Well, then the Jews went away and some villagers crept back and found her, and besides, the United Nations Truce Commission also found her...My guide looked embarrassed."

Which brings us back to Saliha. Despite compelling anecdotal evidence, there's little else to substantiate many of the massacre allegations in the area, Saliha included. Mass graves have never been found - or reported - and government reports, those that have been seen, are sketchy, contradictory, evasive or all of the above. None of which means civilians weren't killed in Saliha and other Galilean villages. But, sixty years later, having missed the opportunity to conduct comprehensive investigations with the cooperation of UN observers, Israel has unwittingly left the door open for the plethora of claims which now overwhelm and drive the 'ethnic cleansing' debate.

And sixty years later, one cannot help but see similar trends in recent events: while Israel's cynicism toward the UN Human Right's Council and its tainted investigation in Gaza is understandable, perhaps a better strategy would have been for the Israeli government to call an immediate internal investigation of violations of the IDF Moral Code with international representation on the investigating committee. Could the UN dismiss an Israeli report which included input from someone like Mary Robinson? or Jimmy Carter? We'll have to add this one to the long list of missed opportunities by both sides.

As for Saliha, we'll never really know. But, one thing is certain: perception of events can carry more weight than reality even reaching mythological levels. And it's very hard to refute a myth.

Vanity Fair

This week's edition of Haveil Havalim, hosted by Esser Agaroth, is up.

Founded by Soccer Dad, Haveil Havalim is a carnival of Jewish blogs -- a weekly collection of Jewish & Israeli blog highlights, tidbits and points of interest collected from blogs all around the world. It's hosted by different bloggers each week and coordinated by Jack. The term 'Haveil Havalim,' which means "Vanity of Vanities," is from Qoheleth, (Ecclesiastes) which was written by King Solomon. King Solomon built the Holy Temple in Jerusalem and later on got all bogged down in materialism and other 'excesses' and realized that it was nothing but 'hevel,' or in English, 'vanity.'

For a great collection of articles, news, thoughts and jokes from the Jewish blogosphere, go here.

Oh yeah. I'm on the list :)

Atonement

As some of you may know, I actually contribute to two blogs: this one, which I started as a showcase for published and non-published articles, and the one I co-write with my wife. I tend to keep the more political stuff here, and use the other one for our shared experiences since making aliyah in 2008. I don't often cross-blog, but I've decided to with a poetical essay I wrote for Yom Kippur. It was, to be honest, my first bit of creative writing (other than ongoing screenplay work) in awhile, and I was pleased with the results. I hope you are to. (click on the image for the full-page version)

גמר חתימה טובה.

Massacre Mania Part 1

When dealing with Palestinian discourse, four words tend to overwhelm every discussion: 'settlements,' 'occupation,' 'apartheid' and, of course, 'massacre.'

There have been practically no encounters between Israel and Arabs in which an accusation of a massacre of some sort wasn't made. The most recent incident, last December's Gaza operation, is being played out now, as both sides offer discrepant civilian death counts and cite contradictory 'expert' sources. A UN war crimes investigation, led by Kapo, former South African judge Richard Goldstone, has just concluded, based on evidence that is already being challenged, that "Israel committed actions amounting to war crimes, possibly crimes against humanity."

The report demands that Israel conduct an investigation of its own within the next three months. Amongst other information the report appears to have ignored, is the fact that the IDF has already examined more than 100 allegations regarding the conduct of its forces during Operation Cast Lead, which have resulted in a further 23 criminal investigations.

The fact that no other investigation is underway against any other state, despite recent conflicts in which thousands of civilians have been killed, is yet another example of the double standard Israelis find so infuriating. For example, for years the government of Sri Lanka fought Tamil rebels in the north of the country. The Tamils are claiming independence for this area where they constitute a majority of the population. Over the course of this period it is estimated some 70,000-80,000 civilians have been killed (as compared to the 500-700 Gaza civilians killed in the recent fighting). Has the UN Human Rights Council equally condemned Sri Lanka and singled it out as it has Israel? In fact, they dismissed it as "an internal matter."

How about Russia where the recent invasion of Georgia claimed, according to some sources, around 20,000 lives? As for Chechnya, there are no solid figures for the number of civilians killed since the second war began in late 1999, but estimates range anywhere between 25,000 and 200,000. When Russian soldiers have admitted brutality, condemnation from the UN has been conspicuously absent. "I remember a Chechen female sniper," a Russian soldier told L.A. Times reporter Maura Reynolds. "We just tore her apart with two armored personnel carriers, having tied her ankles with steel cables. There was a lot of blood, but the boys needed it."

It would appear that it is only the Jewish 'moral compass' that some critics see as out of whack. But our ‘moral compass’ is just fine, thank you. Anyone who knows anything about Judaism will understand the abhorrence at taking lives - any lives - Israeli soldiers feel. While I'm not dismissing the possibility that terrible incidents have occured - we're still dealing with flawed humans in a citizen's army, after all, who make mistakes, get angry, are stupid - anyone familiar with the situation knows that much of the criticism of the recent mission in Gaza came from Israelis. Self-criticism and introspection is alive and well here.

Beyond Gaza, it's worth remembering that other alleged 'massacres,' such as the Jenin libel, have already been debunked, even by experts generally sympathetic to the Palestinian cause (Most NGOs and international human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, tend to deal in half-truths, which are more difficult to counter, rather than outright lies).

All of which reminds me of a saying about truth and war. But Benjamin Disraeli really put it best when he wrote: "It is easier to be critical than correct."